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“To develop our listening capacity to be sure that we hear everything”: 
 
Sorting Out Voices on Women's Rights in Morocco 
 
By Sumi Colligan 
 
 
In Doing Daily Battle: Interviews with Moroccan Women, Fatima Mernissi, a 
Moroccan sociologist and feminist, discusses her interview with a woman from the 
Middle Atlas mountains who migrates to Rabat to secure a job at a carpet factory. The 
difficulties that she faces as she struggles to accommodate to her role as a laborer in an 
urban shantytown cause her to reflect nostalgically on rural childhood. Mernissi cautions 
(1988: 176): 
 
It is necessary to avoid generalizing, to avoid projecting on poor women our own 
preoccupations and problems, and, above all, to do our work as intellectuals. By 
this I mean: to develop our listening capacity, to be sure that we hear everything, 
even those things that don’t fit into our theories and pretty constructs. And, above 
all, to avoid positing a `return to the past’ as an alternative for women. For even 
Tahra, who seems to flounder and lose her country vigor in the face of the 
disorder of a city where she has no place, looks to education as the solution for 
future generations. She only idealizes her childhood, her past, in order to find 
strength for confronting her future, not for returning to it. 
 
In this chapter, I intend to expand on the theme of developing “our listening 
capacity, to be sure that we hear everything” in an attempt to avoid perpetuating the 
stereotype of the passive, victimized Third World woman whose only hope of liberation 
is through the consciousness raising and activist efforts of Western feminists. Much of 
the current writing on human rights and women’s rights in North Africa and the Middle 
East suggests that world-wide endorsement of such principles and platforms is most 
likely to be successful if the people to whom they apply feel a sense of ownership in their 
creation. The experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism in this region has been a 
powerful shaper of a social memory that serves as a critical, interpretive lens for 
assessing the value and applicability of recent international human rights and feminist 
agendas. While it is true that Africans themselves (as well as members of other Third 
World constituencies) have engaged in theorizing and executing policies concerning 
women’s human rights, their voices have not been given equal weight in international 
forums that address these issues (Gathii and Nyamu 1996: 295; Oloka-Onyango and 
Tamale 1995: 701). The consequence of such an imbalance has been a perpetuation of 
international hierarchies of power that contribute to the on-going polarization of the West 
and the Third World and a limiting of the definition and scope of struggles perceived to 
fall within the purview of women’s human rights (Gathii and Nyamu 1996: 294).  
Oloka-Onyango and Tamale (1995: 713) suggest that theoretically one remedy to 
this imbalance lies in an “intra-cultural and cross-cultural dialogue” that recognizes the 
“personal is political, but the political is extremely rich and diverse.” Moreover, social 
movement theory in the West is moving away from postulating generic models for social 
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movements that presuppose the necessity of formal organizations and networks and 
social actors that share the same grievances and interests. To a degree, then, this theory 
offers the potential to capture “the richness and diversity” with which social movements 
manifest themselves in multiple locations and dovetails with views espoused by Third 
World feminists. Indeed it states: 
 
...the new social movement actor both actively constructs and is constrained by a 
world of social meanings rooted in specific historic contexts and based in the 
experiences and identities of race, gender, class and nationality (McClurg Miller 
1992: 21-22).  
 
This statement suggests that a person’s subjectivity may be shaped by a variety of 
influences and identities and coincides with the perspective that we should not make 
sense of women’s experiences exclusively through the lens of gender oppression. For 
example, in the story of Tahra recounted by Mernissi, Tahra is marginalized by virtue of 
being a poor, female, rural migrant, but centered by having any job at all in a country 
where unemployment for both men and women is quite high.
1 
Moreover, this approach 
supports a concern expressed by Third World feminists that the knowledge acquired by 
Western feminists concerning how to battle gender inequities not be automatically 
granted greater authority than knowledge produced in other social settings. In fact, one of 
the most salient lessons we can draw from Mernissi’s example is the importance of 
paying close attention to women’s words regardless of their social positioning.  
Nonetheless, the new social movement theory stops short in several important 
ways. First, utilizing the term, “social movement actor,” implies that such an actor can 
clearly be differentiated from other kinds of social actors. Yet Heng (1997: 30) suggests 
that “feminist” action in the Third World (and no doubt in the First World as well) 
assumes many different guises and that those who engage in it do not always adopt 
feminist labels and discourse. As already stated, a narrow definition of social movement 
can lead to ineffective coalitions and partial solutions. Second, too much emphasis on 
social location and positioning risks the danger of essentializing consciousness, denying 
its potential for expansiveness and fluidity (Lam 1994: 891). This outcome may be 
produced by downplaying the process by which critical self and social examination as 
well as exposure to the ideas of others can have a transformative influence on 
consciousness. Finally, social, economic, and political inequalities are produced, in part, 
by global processes that transcend national boundaries and as Alexander and Mohanty 
(1997: xxix) argue, “global processes clearly require global alliances.” While the new 
social movement theory does not ignore the fact that some social movements appear in 
more than one nation, its conceptual framework focuses largely on the process by which 
                                                 
1
 The terms, “margin” and “center” are borrowed from bell hook’s book, Feminist Theory: From Margin to 
Center. In her book, she (1984: 26-27) speaks of bringing in the voices of women at the margins, women 
who have been excluded from shaping feminist theory by virtue of their race, class, sexual orientation, and 
other possible characteristics. hooks (1984: 18) also points out that women at the margins may share 





Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 1, No 1  2000 
meaningful social action emerges within the parameters of face-to-face encounters 
(McClurg Miller 1992: 7). As such, it fails to elaborate upon the manner in which global 
coalitions are or could be established, negotiated, and/or sustained. As the maxim, “the 
local is global” illustrates (Oloka-Onyango and Tamale 1995: 701), Third World feminist 
analyses broaden our understanding of social movements by showing the way in which 
historical and social particularities overlap with global processes, and in aiding us to 
better conceptualize each, bring us closer to a theory that is more accurately informed by 
and informs practice.  
The intersection of local, national, and global inequalities in North Africa has 
generated conditions of flux and indeterminacy as my focus on Morocco will reveal. As a 
result, women often find themselves caught between pre-capitalist and Western, 
modernizing, transnational capitalist forces and expectations (Abu-Odeh 1992: 1528; 
Macleod 1991: xiv) and the surveillance and repression of authoritarian regimes 
(Hammoudi 1997: 152). Under these conditions, women frequently adopt a diversity of 
approaches for addressing the contradictions, opportunities, and constraints they face as 
they draw upon differential access to autonomy, privilege, protection, and resources 
(Abu-Odeh 1992: 1533; Lam 1994: 872). Thus the relationship of these women to 
hegemonic power is complex and the line that separates contestation from complicity not 
so transparent (Macleod 1991: 19). The ideas of French philosopher, Michel de Certeau 
(1984: xix) are apropos to illuminating such struggles: 
 
A tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it 
over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance. It has at its disposal 
no base where it can capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansions, and 
secure independence with respect to circumstances. ...a tactic depends on time--it 
is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized “on the wing.”  
 
Hence changing circumstances create a space and possibilities for applying 
“tactics” that resist and manipulate prescribed social relations and allow women to assert 
some modicum of control over their lives (Macleod 1991: 19). De Certeau (1984: 33-39) 
believes that a sustained use of tactics can, in fact, produce meaningful change, and may 
not simply reinforce the status quo. Since gender, class, and global inequalities all have 
an impact on Third World women, however differentially, it is sometimes difficult to 
pinpoint the exact source of one’s oppression (Macleod 1991: 145). Hence, tactics rather 
than well-orchestrated strategies may be for some a necessary means of responding to 
these increasingly “invidious forms of power” (Macleod 1991: 133).  
In light of these caveats and considerations, my first task here is to draw upon 
Moroccan ethnography and autobiography as a means of assessing shifts in local 
practices, understandings, and aspirations of Moroccan women pertaining to status and to 
male/female dynamics and the reasons behind those shifts. I then plan to demonstrate 
links between insights gained from ethnography and autobiography and goals and 
projects of the Moroccan feminist organizations and other Moroccan based human rights 
groups. Overall, the purpose of this case study is not to provide a descriptive profile of 
women’s public participation in Moroccan society, but to highlight certain themes and 
issues that emerge from the examples under discussion. My conclusion will reference this 
discussion as a vehicle for posing a cautionary note concerning the process by which 
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universal human rights are formulated and implemented, proposing that such a process 
remain sensitive to the specificity of contexts in which women carve out their identities, 
goals, and actions. Of course, as Oloka-Onyango and Tamale point out, universality and 
specificity are not intrinsically oppositional forces because a sense of connectedness and 
a world-wide coalition cannot be genuinely achieved until “women’s diverse priorities 
and interests have been recognized and the various barriers to this goal have been 
identified by the international community of women” (1995: 698). Hence, my main 
objective is to illustrate through an examination of a particular case study the value of 
acknowledging “both distance and connection” derived from “a special knowledge in the 




I first explore the impact of French colonialism on an emergent women’s rights 
consciousness. The period of the French Protectorate (1912-1956) was characterized by 
two basic stages. The first stage was based on “‘applied’ ethnology and orientalism” 
(Hammoudi 1997: 101) and involved indirect rule. The second stage, which followed the 
devastation of World War I, was expanded to include major expropriation of lands, 
massive public works projects, and the creation of big business (Hammoudi 1997: 102-
104). The French consolidated their power by making deals with rural notables 
(Mamdani 1996: 83-84), transforming the sultan into a figurehead who was practically 
under house arrest, and surveying populations, fixing them timelessly on maps 
(Hammoudi 1997: 16,108). Moreover, under the guise of ethnoscience, they studied 
Moroccan practices concerning status and hierarchy in order to establish and maintain 
authority and control, imbuing “difference with an irreducible quality” (Hammoudi 1997: 
107).  
In this vein, the French deliberately avoided efforts to improve the lives of women 
because they believed that tampering with “intimate” affairs would undermine their 
colonizing mission (Maher 1978: 105). Nevertheless, Vinogradov (1974: 198) argues that 
since French attitudes toward the Moroccans were generally negative,
2
 the demeaning 
and humiliating manner with which Moroccan men were treated tended to destabilize 
marriages and contributed to the further economic marginalization of women, including 
an increase in prostitution. Additionally, French run agribusiness turned both men and 
women into exploited laborers (Hammoudi 1997: 124). 
The Moroccans developed pragmatic and symbolic strategies to rid their social 
body of the ills brought about by this external domination and cooptation. In 1930 the 
Sultan refused to sign a law dividing Arab and Berber territories and from that point on, 
became the symbol of nationhood. Ironically, prior to the Protectorate, the influence of 
the Sultanate expanded and contracted, but under colonial rule, the nationalists rallied 
behind him and helped consolidate his power (Hammoudi 1997: 15-16).  
The Moroccan independence movement provided women with opportunities to 
transgress their traditional roles and to challenge commonly held assumptions about 
gender. Not surprisingly, these opportunities manifested themselves differentially along 
class lines. In an article entitled, “History and Myth: Women’s Stories of the Moroccan 
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Resistance”, Alison Baker (1995: 31) discusses interviews she had with poor women 
from Casablanca and Rabat who became involved in the Resistance by smuggling arms, 
keeping watch for French soldiers, and cooking and cleaning for male Resistance fighters 
after the exile of Mohammed V in 1953. One of the recurrent themes in these women’s 
testimonies is the way in which their activities revolutionized their own self-image as 
well as the way men viewed them. One woman recalled that as a child, she had seen a 
photograph of a Palestinian woman with a gun in a local newspaper. At the time, the 
image so contradicted her expectations of femininity that she concluded that the person 
must belong to a liminal category, neither man nor woman. When she assumed her new 
role, she reveled in her ability and the ability of other women who were co-participants to 
be “seen” as authentic selves, active, trustworthy, and courageous and their ability to 
overturn the presumption of suspiciousness and inferiority (Baker 1995: 37-38). 
Unfortunately, as was common in many African independence struggles, after 
independence was won and their contributions were no longer needed, they were not 
encouraged to further realize their potential and returned to a state of invisibility. This 
state has been further reinforced by the Moroccan government’s withholding of official 
Resistance designation to many of these women due to their lack of “public” participation 
and hence, absence of male corroboration of their roles (Baker 1995: 41-42). The shifts in 
opportunities for women are further documented in Fatima Mernissi’s delightful 
autobiography, Dreams of Trespass: Tales of a Harem Girlhood. Mernissi (1994) writes 
about growing up in an elite, landholding family in Fez in the 1940s and focuses on the 
manner in which nationalist aspirations transformed her childhood and generated both 
harmony and tension between “tradition” and “modernity” as these processes unfolded in 
family debates and practices. She (1994: 86) emphasizes that the decision of her extended 
family “council” to enroll her in a secular school was born, in part, out of a recognition 
that information and a talent for straddling two cultures would enable her generation to 
infiltrate the minds of their enemy, thereby helping to reestablish the hudud or sacred 
frontier between Christians and Muslims. According to the nationalists, everyone was 
required for this battle so that at least a partial dissolution of the domestic frontier was 
necessary to restore order and bring about a lasting independence. Her mother and 
maternal grandmother offered particular encouragement. In her mother’s words, “Hiding 
does not solve a woman’s problems. It just identifies her as an easy victim” (Mernissi 
1994: 100). 
 
Post-Colonial Realities: The Public Sphere  
Mernissi (1994: 37) recalls conversations with her maternal grandmother and the 
hopes that they inspired in her: “‘Morocco has changed quickly, little girl,’ she often told 
me, ‘and it will keep on doing so.’ That prediction made me feel very happy. I was going 
to grow up in a wonderful kingdom where women had rights, including the freedom to 
snuggle up to their own husbands every night.” However, the current literature suggests 
the gains Moroccan women have made are uneven as a group and have been granted 
categorically according to class and rural or urban origins. Moreover, there is 
disagreement concerning the degree to which women have trespassed and/or dissolved 
the domestic/public divide and debate concerning their inclusion in or exclusion from the 
umma or universal community of Muslim believers. So the question of women “hiding,” 
what constitutes hiding, and the consequences of “hiding” have not yet been resolved. 
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Ilumoka (1994: 310) argues that Western human rights discourse, with its 
emphasis on formal rights, has tended to obscure the distinct ideological and structural 
conditions that differentiate nations and create inequalities in access to the ideals 
embodied in these rights. She states that an identification of those conditions is a 
prerequisite to achieving the equality necessary for such rights to be realized. With this 
perspective in mind, I will explore current conditions in Morocco that are relevant to 
women’s human rights. 
The modest pace of social reform in Morocco can be attributed to a variety of 
factors. According to Abdellah Hammoudi, a Moroccan anthropologist, the independence 
movement was only partially successful in democratizing the Moroccan political process 
because Moroccan authoritarianism has reasserted itself in new forms. For example, 
military officers are often selected from members of notable families that once 
collaborated with colonialists (Hammoudi 1997: 24) and military troops have been 
stationed at old colonial outposts located in the country’s interior, a move that suggests 
that internal policing rather than territorial defense is the goal (Hammoudi 1997: 27).  
Hammoudi argues that an examination of political economy in and of itself is not 
sufficient to explain the persistence of authoritarianism. He believes the fact that the 
actions of the monarch are not bound by the constitution can be made sense of, in part, 
through a consideration of “cultural schemata” (1997: 12). These schemata are based on 
master/disciple relationships enacted in Sufi brotherhoods that first developed in the 12th 
century. These relationships were based on domination and submission. The disciples 
were “feminized” and awaited their opportunity to become masters themselves and create 
their own following. Similar themes are dramatized today in masquerades held at 
celebrations that mark the end of the lunar year (Hammoudi 1997: 147). Hammoudi 
postulates that Moroccans tolerate such rule because these themes have a strong, 
underlying, evocative appeal.  
Additionally, Hammoudi maintains that these schemata have serious implications 
for women because they essentially render women irrelevant. He (1997: 149) explains, 
“The unquestionable and highest authority (that of a saint) is embodied in a chain of men 
whose procreation does not involve women.” Hammoudi fears that because these patterns 
emerge from a religious foundation, women’s efforts to establish their own authority 
within Moroccan society are likely to be stonewalled (1997: 147). 
Nonetheless, the Moroccan monarch, King Hassan II, has made some inroads in 
improving the educational opportunities and literacy rates of women,
3
 thereby bolstering 
their income and economic status (Griffiths 1996: 66).
4
 These changes have been brought 
about through compulsory education legislation in the early 1960s and the government’s 
identification of expansion of female education as a social priority in the 1980s.
5
 
Resources have been unevenly concentrated though, so that women in urban areas fare 
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 According to a UNESCO report from 1994, the overall literacy rate in Morocco is 50%, with 38% for 
women and 61% for men (Moghadam 1997: 27). 
 
4
 According to UNDP labor statistics, Moroccan women now constitute about 26% of the total labor force, 








Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 1, No 1  2000 
considerably better than those in the countryside. In fact, one study suggests that the 
literacy rate for females in the cities is almost five times as high as it in rural areas 
(Griffiths 1996: 67). The reasons that underlie these discrepancies are largely economic.
6
 
About half the agricultural work is done by females (although generally unremunerated) 
and girls are sometimes pressured to drop out of school to help their families or are sent 
to cities as domestic servants in exchange for small amounts of monetary compensation 
for their parents. As a result of these inequities, both males and females have flooded to 
urban environments, making the distribution of population in rural and urban areas even 
for the first time in Moroccan history (Griffiths 1996: 65). These shifts have created a 
burgeoning middle class and female urban residents now constitute about one third of all 
state employees (Griffiths 1996: 67).  
Despite these improvements, Morocco’s current economic climate, characterized 
by economic recession due, in part, to price fluctuations in the international market for 
phosphates, Morocco’s primary export, along with the threat of Islamic fundamentalism 
from neighboring Algeria, may signal a period of increased social control and decreased 
public debate (Griffiths 1996: 68). A 16% unemployment rate in the cities (an apparently 
low estimate)
7
 has given rise to social unrest that the government has attempted to quell 
(Griffiths 1996: 67). Moreover, Morocco’s request for entry into the European Union has 
been denied, producing agreements only to turn Morocco into a “free trade zone” 
(http://europa.eu.int/search 97cgi). This rejection has taken place in spite of the fact that 
about half a million Moroccans work in France (Griffiths 1996: 64), many filling 
positions that the French themselves eschew. Such agreements stand to benefit European 
and Moroccan elites, but will probably contribute to the further impoverishment of the 
majority.  
Interestingly, while these modern day shifts and competing forces have produced 
uneven benefits for men and women, and women in different social classes and regions, 
they have nonetheless disrupted patterns of authoritarianism, patriarchy, gender, and 
family (Gilsenan Oct. 2, 1997: 18). These changes, however unintended, tend to create 
openings for women in varying ways depending on social location, allowing women to 
assert themselves in an untraditional fashion. In this context, women may counter 
oppressive forces and encounter new ones. Women have generated diverse responses to 
this confusing and unstable terrain.  
For example, urban-based middle and upper class women have found that these 
shifts, along with an increase in international attention toward women’s issues, have 
created greater opportunities to bring women’s issues to public arenas in the past decade 
(Simons March 8, 1998: A6). Elizabeth Fernea reveals that women’s rights organizations 
(1998: 106) and women’s studies programs (1998: 72) have emerged and are making an 
effort to document women’s problems, establish women’s literacy projects, and help 
create an infrastructure for women’s social services. These groups are also attempting to 
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 Other reasons cited for lower school attendance rates in rural areas include lack of educational 
infrastructure (about 13%) and resistance from parents to sending their girls to school (about 23%) 
(Griffiths 1996: 67). 
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influence the political process and have had a modicum of success in that the first two 
women to be elected to Parliament entered office in 1993 (Fernea 1998: 120).  
Likewise, while poor women are finding themselves with less economic security, 
they, too, have been making a greater appearance in the public sphere. Along with a high 
divorce rate, recent migratory patterns have produced many women heads of household 
(Fernea 1998: 116)
8
 and some of these women are engaging in novel ecomomic 
enterprises. For example, Deborah Kapchan’s ethnographic research (1996) in Benei 
Mellal, a provincial capital in the Middle Atlas Mountains, reveals shifting patterns in 
women’s activities. Among these are a transition from the selling of food staples to a 
selling of contraband from Spain (1996: 56), thus involving women in capitalist 
exchange, and an increase in the number of female orators in the performance section of 
the marketplace. Kapchan notes that these shifts not only mark an expanded economic 
sphere, but an expanded use of male discourse as well. By this she means that women 
will recite the works of Islamic scholars or posit, “Aren’t we all Muslims?,” as bargaining 
strategies to establish their legitimacy and trustworthiness with their customers (1996: 
141). In the first case, women are appropriating traditionally male domains of knowledge 
and in the second case, they are asserting inclusion in the umma, a construct of a 
universal community of Muslim faithful that has been defined largely in male terms.  
The implications of Kapchan’s findings for a consideration of women’s rights 
issues are significant. She suggests that in Morocco the marketplace is seen as polluting, 
but that its placement at the margins of the social body also makes it a site of 
transformation where new forms of behavior and discourse are tested (1996: 36). What 
this indicates is that an openness to social change cannot be measured simply by the 
monitoring of human rights organizations and movements among the upper classes. 
Additionally, close attention should be paid to the words and actions of women at the 
margins for they can provide clues for strategies for grassroots initiatives that improve 
the quality of life for women. While structural inequalities produced by national and 
international processes may contribute to cultural, economic, and social paralysis, we 
must not disregard the role of human agents in generating cracks through which new 
possibilities emerge. In fact, the Moroccans themselves hold a polysemic concept called 
fitna that captures the perpetually indeterminate, contingent, and shifting nature of social 
relations and social rules.
9
 Perhaps the potential for fitna is magnified under current 
circumstances. With this process in mind, Gilsenan (Oct. 2, 1997: 18) suggests that state 
authoritarianism may not be so absolute because:  
 
If we also consider the role of the myriad informal practices of everyday life, the 
resistances, the evasions, and the ways of getting by, it may be that the 
legitimation of the monarch’s power is only a sporadically relevant issue. We 
cannot assume that silence means consent. Indeed, the powerless are commonly 
expected to pay lip service to their oppressors (Kapchan 1996: 230).  
 
                                                 
8
 Fernea (1998: 116) reports that in the Northern coastal area 60% of the men may migrate to Europe. 
 
9
 Pandolfo (1997: 56) suggests that fitna can refer to “a flirtation with the unknown, with the insecurity of 
novel paths, that taste for dissent, dispute, and hazardous games.” She also argues that Moroccans hold an 
ambivalent attitude toward this process, seeing it neither as totally good nor bad (1997: 332). 
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Unfortunately, class interests in Morocco as in many other places, tend to divide 
women and make it more difficult for them to identify commonalities. Again, middle 
class women have been successful in entering professional and public sector jobs while 
poor girls and women of rural origins have flocked to the cities to work as their maids 
(Griffiths 1996: 68; Kapchan 1996: 216). While this trend has brought women of 
different classes into close proximity to one another, these maids have also been cast as 
instigators of social disruption and chaos (another manifestation of fitna) by their female 
employers because their employers fear that the maids will publicize the private sphere 
and raise questions about their honor (Kapchan 1996: 230). Kapchan (1996: 232) argues 
that a maid may also “become an object of desire or envy because she is made to 
represent the transgression of prescriptive laws of feminine behavior.” Nonetheless, 
cracks again emerge as when maids demand that their employer’s children teach them 
how to read and write (Kapchan 1996: 217).  
Moreover, recent endeavors orchestrated by the Democratic Association of 
Moroccan Women (ADFM) to raise public awareness about sexual harassment at work 
are indicative of the kind of coalition building that can take place between white collar 
and blue collar women. Since sexual harassment on the job is not a class based 
phenomenon, it is an issue that can potentially bridge a gap between women of diverse 
backgrounds and experiences and serve as a springboard for further identification of 
shared concerns. In this particular instance, the ADFM joined 450 female employees of 
Moroccan Manufacturing, a textile industry in Rabat, who went on strike to protest a 
physical attack on one of their female employees by a foreman (El Banna 1996: 21).  
Women’s opportunities to transgress and subvert public boundaries are not 
limited solely to educational and employment spheres. According to Buitelaar (1993: 
177), the month of Ramadan is a time-out from public isolation and routinely imposed 
restrictions on female behavior. Women may fast together as well as join each other in 
pilgrimages, almsgiving, and merrymaking. Furthermore, while men may devalue 
women’s contributions to Islam, the fact that women view their own actions as significant 
suggests that women’s inclusion in the umma (universal community of Muslim believers) 
is not necessarily contingent on men’s willingness to acknowledge that they belong. One 
may belong to a muted group and yet reject externally imposed definitions of self that 
deny the validity of one’s human agency and unique consciousness. In fact, Rosen (1978: 
561) contends that in Morocco women and men are often divided in their understanding 
and interpretations of relationships and events. As a result, women’s statements 
frequently contain a subtext implying that men should not be too confident because the 
world is not always what it appears to be. 
Therefore, these divisions may actually be productive in that they may provide 
unmonitored arenas for women to identify roles and meanings within Islam that may lead 
to greater equity and inclusion. As in the case of Buitelaar’s discussion of women’s 
activities during Ramadam, Mernissi (1977: 103) reports that “unorthodox” 
manifestations of Islam such as the tombs of marabouts
10
 (saints) offer a sanctuary for 
women who seek solace and advice from each other. Unlike much of public space, these 
                                                 
10
 Marabouts are individuals, sometimes of Prophetic descent, who are associated with baraka or God’s 
grace. They can be living or dead. Those who visit them or their tombs leave offerings and seek some of 
the baraka to rub off on them in exchange (Eickelman 1981: 228). 
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pilgrimage sites are places that men pass through, and women occupy (Mernissi 1977: 
104). Mernissi (1977: 104) argues further: 
 
They embody the refusal to accept arrogant expertise, to submit blindly to 
authority, to be treated as subordinate. This insistence on going to saints’ tombs 
exemplifies the North African woman’s traditional claim that she is active, can 
decide her needs for herself and do something about them, a claim that the 
Muslim patriarchal system denies her. 
 
Currently, Muslim women in North Africa and in the Middle East are also 
exploring the possibilities of creating greater equity for women within “formal” Islam as 
well. For example, Fatima Mernissi is working on a project on “Humanist Islam” with 
some colleagues that involves an investigation of Islamic writing that throws a positive 
light on women’s rights (King-Irani 1996: 16). Mernissi (1995: 33) argues that there is a 
mistaken assumption in the West that the goals of Islam and the goals of democracy are 
necessarily contradictory. She points out that people often fail to distinguish between the 
Muslim state as a form of government and Islam as a culture or religion. She reminds 
readers of the emphasis on individual responsibility within Sunni Islam and asserts the 
possibility of locating an ethics within “tradition” that may be beneficial to women. 
However, she (1995: 44) also recognizes that “minorities, women, and slaves are the 
groups that have historically constituted a challenge and a limitation to Islam’s claim to 
universality and equality.” The degree to which Islam can genuinely accommodate these 
groups clearly remains to be seen.  
Nonetheless, Mernissi’s comments serve as an important reminder that culture is 
neither monolithic nor static and that “traditional” culture need not always be viewed as 
antithetical to women’s human rights.11 Third World women seeking to bolster their 
status, security, and well-being need not always look to the West for alternative 
constructions of rights. Indeed, Mernissi (1995: 43) legitimately asserts that the 
contemporary “conservatism” of Islam (when, in fact, it acts conservatively), is often 
bolstered by American foreign policy. She (1995: 43) quips, “One cannot imagine a USA 
without its precious Arab oil, or the Emir of Kuwait without his Pentagon friends.” If we 
in the West want to see Islamic countries establish an atmosphere of greater openness, 
then we also need to accept our responsibility in having contributed to some of the 
excesses of the Islamic state and our responsibility in helping to rectify the damage. 
As it stands, some Moroccan women may believe that the solutions rest neither in 
the West nor strictly in their own traditions. These conflicting and competing forces and 
the dilemmas they pose are mirrored in certain examples of contemporary Moroccan 
cinema. In one such film, “A Door to the Sky,” produced in 1988 by filmmaker, Farida 
Benlyazid, a young woman returns from France to Morocco, dressed in punk clothes, and 
feeling alienated and out of place. In time, she realizes that Western society, too, has its 
oppressive characteristics and drawing upon the Islamic practice of charity, transforms 
parts of her home into a battered women’s shelter (Shohat 1997: 205-206). Shohat (1997: 
206) comments:  
                                                 
11
 Afkhami and Friedl (1997: xiii) caution that it is important to avoid essentializing the qualities of Islam, 
Muslims, and Muslim women since stereotypes may “conceal a rich variety of different beliefs, practices, 
life-styles, and philosophies in Muslim societies.” 
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“A Door to the Sky” envisions an aesthetic that affirms Islamic culture, while 
inscribing it with a feminist consciousness, offering an alternative both to the 
Western imaginary and to an Islamic fundamentalist representation of Muslim 
women. 
 
Such images have considerable value because they may encourage critical 
reflection and offer alternatives to well-to-do urban movie goers, but what of those who 
don’t necessarily have the luxury of openly positing challenges to systems of oppression 
that permeate their everyday lives?  
Even when there appears to emerge a backlash in women’s freedoms, it is prudent 
to proceed cautiously in one’s judgment concerning what signifies retreat. For example, 
Leila Hessini (1994: 40) notes that when she was enrolled in a Moroccan university, the 
most outspoken women were the ones who wore the hijab (a form of Islamic dress that 
leaves the face uncovered). She takes issue with the idea that women’s exclusion from 
the public sphere is so clear-cut and posits that the hijab allows one to remain interior 
within an exterior world (Hesseni 1994: 43). In confirmation of this analysis, Elizabeth 
Fernea, an American writer and women’s studies professor who has documented the lives 
of women in different regions of North Africa, quotes a Moroccan university student as 
saying, “I can wear a scarf or not-But the real question is what do I do with my education, 
how do I use it for myself and society” (1998: 99). Studies show that the women who are 
donning this type of clothing are primarily of lower middle class background (Abu-Odeh 
1992: 1528; Macleod 1991: 97). As such, they are not guaranteed the rewards and 
advantages of solidly middle and upper class women. They must battle to maintain their 
position in the class structure and their newly gained presence in public space. The 
majority of the women who elect to wear the hijab consider it a choice, albeit one that is 
shaped, in part, by the increase in violence and harassment that is being perpetrated on 
women who have become more self-sufficient (Abu-Odeh 1992: 1530
12
; Macleod 1991: 
113). The veil, as a multivalent symbol, gives the appearance of complicity to normative 





Thus the donning of the hijab does not automatically mean that women have 
relinquished their rights and will again be easy victims as Mernissi’s mother’s warning 
suggests. Rather Hesseini (1994: 53) contends that this form of clothing makes it easier 
for women to be seen for their personalities and minds instead of as sex objects. In fact, 
Muslim women have not necessarily found greater freedom in the wearing of Western 
                                                 
12
 Lama Abu-Odeh (1992: 1530) is an Arab feminist who says that she rejects the veil for herself, but 
understands why women wear it. She points out that many working and middle class women in the Middle 
East don’t have cars to transport themselves back and forth from work and school and don’t enjoy the 
protection available to upper class women. 
 
13
 Macleod (1991: 100-101) argues that the veil is a powerful symbol in the Middle East because it is 
subject to the wearer’s control and at the same time signifies constraint. She also points out that social 
performance rather than internalized beliefs mark conformity to morality in much of the Middle East. For 
these reasons, the veil may provide an avenue for resistance that remains outside of the awareness of the 
“oppressors.” By the same token, however, its association with “tradition” may also mute the effect of the 
protest because it can be coopted by more powerful groups who want to maintain women’s subordination. 
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style clothing because Western-based mass media and advertising continue to exploit 
women as sexual objects. Muslim women view these images brought to them by 
globalizing processes and some conclude that the solution to their problems does not lie 
in capitalist appropriation (Abu-Odeh 1992: 1528; Macleod 1991: 136). Thus while 
Moroccan women’s progress in the public sphere has been ambiguous and uneven, 
women’s secondary status has not remained uncontested and women have resisted 
designation as simple victims. Indeed African-American feminist writer, bell hooks 
(1984: 45), argues that being a victim is a luxury of the privileged. She explains:  
 
Women who are exploited and oppressed daily cannot afford to relinquish the 
belief that they exercise some measure of control, however relative, over their 
lives. They cannot afford to see themselves solely as “victims” because their 
survival depends on continued exercise of whatever personal powers they possess. 
(1984: 45)  
 
Post-Colonial Realities: Women and the Law 
Coomaraswamy (1994: 48) contends that the area of human rights that is likely to 
meet with the most amount of resistance is personal status codes that legally define the 
status of men, women, and children because in many societies norms that govern family 
relations are more ideologically entrenched than other aspects of culture. In Morocco, 
interpersonal relations may be the arena in which men feel a need to assert the most legal 
control and from which women have drawn their primary identities. Additionally, 
challenging sexist legal and interpersonal expectations that impact the family are 
complicated by the fact that for many women, families are not only a source of 
oppression, but a source of dignity and comfort as well (Fernea 1998: 420; hooks 1984: 
37; Macleod 1991: 146). Moreover, despite the differential obligations conferred on 
husband and wife by Islamic law and practice within the domestic context, women have 
nonetheless managed to display considerable strength and as a result, men sometimes fear 




There is no question that legal reform in Morocco has been slow paced. When 
Mernissi (1994: 37) imagined as a child that she would live in a kingdom where “women 
could snuggle up with their husbands,” she was making reference to the abolition of 
polygyny. However, as Coomaraswamy might have predicted, Mernissi’s hopes were 
never realized. Mernissi (1994: 37) explains the inertia of legal change in regard to 
women as follows:  
 
Most Muslim governments, and their fundamentalist oppositions, even those that 
call themselves modern, keep polygamy in their family law codes, not because it 
is particularly widespread but because they want to show women that their needs 
                                                 
14
 Fernea (1998: 420) notes that women’s powers within the domestic domain are sometimes excluded 
from mention because: 
...we Western women are brainwashed from childhood into believing that the only important acts 
are those that men perform and that women must replicate those acts if they are to gain power or 
agency. This leads us, I believe, to downgrade any activities and evidences of agency that take 
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are not important. The law is not there to serve them, nor to guarantee their right 
to happiness or emotional security. The prevailing belief is that women and the 
law do not belong together; women ought to accept men’s law because they 
cannot change it. 
 
Mernissi’s pessimism can be traced, in part, to the experiences of the Association 
of Democratic Moroccan Women (ADFM) when they collected signatures in 1992 to 
modify the Moroccan personal status law, the mudawana. In response to these women’s 
initiative, the fundamentalist press called for their execution as heretics (Mernissi 1994: 
37). However, despite such violent rhetoric, some reforms were instituted in 1993. In 
fact, the King himself, although only moderately supportive of altering these codes, 
intervened on the women’s behalf to quell the threats (Fernea 1998: 113). By doing so, 
the King was taking risks because the legitimacy of the monarchy rests, in part, on 
upholding Islamic law (Ziai 1997: 77). The King, of course, had to balance this risk 
against the risk of his country following in the suit of Algeria (Fernea 1998: 113).  
The reforms that were signed into law on September 10, 1993 included the 
following stipulations: that a male guardian could no longer contract a marriage for a 
fatherless woman without her consent; that a wife could indicate in her marriage contract 
that she was opposed to her husband taking a second wife and could terminate the union 
if he violated these terms;
15
 and that a man could only obtain a divorce by appearing 
before a judge (Mayer 1995: 113; Ziai 1997: 75-76). Morocco did ratify the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1993, 
but despite the modest improvements documented above, resists implementing strictures 
that are fully in compliance with the Convention (Mayer 1995: 105).
16
 Mayer (1995: 111-
112) suggests that the Moroccan government’s unwillingness to enact law that 
encompasses more radical reforms is derived from Islamic law’s emphasis on the 
complimentarity of male/female roles, an emphasis that the government refuses to 
acknowledge is discriminatory. 
However, Mayer (1995: 105) cautions: 
 
...resistance to the international norm of women’s equality and double talk about 
women’s rights are not limited to Islam. The US can invoke its Constitution and 
the Vatican can invoke natural law and Church tradition just as Muslim countries 
invoke Islamic law. In all three cases, however, the common strategy is to appeal 
to the laws of Nature, which have made women different from men. The 
rhetorical strategies attempt in all cases to establish that the speakers’ opposition 
to the principle of women’s equality as established in international law is based 
on higher laws that the speakers are powerless to alter. 
 
                                                 
15
 Ziai (1997: 172) reports that official statistics in Morocco indicate that 3% of all Moroccan marriages are 
polygynous, although the number may be somewhat higher. 
 
16
 Ziai (1997: 76-77) states that the 1993 reforms to the mudawana did not address the following: men are 
expected to provide support for their wives, while women are expected to be obedient to their husbands; 
fathers still have a say in their daughters’ marriages; males and females are subject to different minimum 
ages for marriages, 18 and 15 respectively; and only widowed women (as opposed to divorced ones) are 
granted both physical and legal guardianship of their children. 
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Regardless of the Moroccan government’s objections to making its personal status 
codes genuinely egalitarian, the fact that any reforms were introduced implies that the 
law is not impervious to social pressure and moreover, the impetus for these changes still 
came from Moroccan women themselves. Many of these women agree that these 
amendments were a valuable first step, but there is growing disagreement concerning the 
degree to which women’s needs can ever be fully met within the framework of Islamic 
legal tradition, and some are endeavoring to expand the scope of civil law instead 
(Simons March 9, 1998: A6).  
While personal status law does not benefit men and women equally, it is 
interesting to note that both men and women perceive law as necessary in Morocco 
(Dwyer 1979: 754). In addition, they see it as something that can be subject to 
interpretation and manipulated to serve one’s own interests (Dwyer 1979: 740). Perhaps 
these points help clarify the conservatism that hinders progress in the area of women’s 
legal rights. However, they may also explain why women have not abandoned the law as 
an arena of struggle. Daisy Dwyer (1979: 755) comments, “Sexual inequality emerges as 
a major stress point in Moroccan society, and the law takes on multiple and conflicting 
complexions in light of it.” Both men and women may agree that “orderly” family 
relations are important, but that agreement does not imply consensus on the value of 
personal status law. Women believe that without the law men will take further advantage 
of them while men believe that the law facilitates the containment of women’s sexual 
desires (containment of fitna), thereby contributing to the maintenance of society (Dwyer 
1979: 754). These discrepancies in the reasons given for why the law is necessary again, 
reveal a crack in the ideological hegemony of male dominance in the area of “intimacy.” 
Hence it appears that women will not forsake the law despite the prevailing attitude that 
women and the law are incompatible.  
 
“To Develop Our Listening Capacity”: Building on What We Hear 
The theme of this paper has been to underscore the importance of paying careful 
attention to what women say and do in their everyday lives as a means of identifying 
localized perceptions, definitions, practices, and directions of and for social change. 
Gocek and Balaghi (1994: 1) argue that a focus on “voice and experience can be utilized 
as two conceptual parameters to recapture the agency of the hegemonized.” However, 
they caution that researchers must situate voice and experience within a social and 
historical context in order to avoid essentializing the very identities that they are 
attempting to demonstrate are constructed, fluid and varied. 
It is within this framework that I began with a discussion of French colonial 
policy on the status of women. The French endeavored to control the Moroccans by 
holding static “tradition,” a body of ideas and practices that they already purported to be 
timeless. The French hoped that labeling the colonized passive and unchanging would 
facilitate their own penetration and domination. Not surprisingly, then, Moroccans tend to 
be suspicious of Western initiated human rights agendas because they believe that it is 
ironic and contradictory to be classified as backward by the same region that has hindered 
their progress. Nonetheless, Mahnaz Afkhami, an Iranian who founded the Sisterhood is 
Global Institute, an institute located in Bethesda, Maryland that is committed to 
promoting education and dialogue on global women’s issues, warns about the dangers of 
shutting off dialogue with the West as a result of this historical legacy: 
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For most of the Third World the experience of colonialism led the dialectic of 
encounter to an intellectual impasse by positing the ‘other’ as the enemy. As so 
much of the other is appropriated in the developmental process, the enemy steals 
within and the impasse, intellectual and political at first, becomes a pathology of 
self-denial. Since the future is claimed by the ‘other,’ the alternative that remains 
is the irredeemable past. In this sense, Islamic traditionalism is a scourge 
bequeathed by the colonial experience. Muslim women must transcend this 
experience if they are to accomplish their task of self-authentication. Above all, 
they should refuse to identify themselves as against the world outside. Rather, 
they ought to seek to lead in defining its issues and shaping its future. (1995: 4)  
 
Despite the reservations Moroccans hold about the West, most of them have thus 
far resisted imposing such an ideological blockade. In fact, the strategies of human rights 
activists within Morocco may offer clues for generating an internal process for setting 
priorities for change and establishing an exchange with the outside world. For example, 
Abderrahim Jami, a lawyer who founded the Moroccan Association of Human Rights in 
1979, states that he has sought the type of activist “who empathizes with the problems 
and pain of other people” (quoted in Dwyer 1991: 164), rather than someone with 
particular political goals or convictions to participate in this organization.
17
 Furthermore, 
Moroccan women’s groups and magazines have solicited women’s testimonies from 
different walks of life in an effort to avoid privileging one voice over another (Fernea 
1998: 417).  
Despite these endeavors, there are many obstacles, contradictions, and challenges 
that Moroccan women will continue to face. While Moroccans may not benefit from 
turning away from the West, the West also need be reminded that they should not turn 
away Moroccans. Capitalist investment that boosts the economic status of small segments 
of the population may not be the answer. It is difficult for nations to put their colonial 
history behind them when neo-colonialism continues to replicate imbalances in power, 
sapping former colonies of their labor and resources. Of course, internal political and 
economic policies that reinforce or expand such inequities must also be reevaluated. 
Additionally, the setting of priorities for Moroccan women is in itself not a 
straightforward matter. Afkhami and Friedl (1997: xiv) explain: 
 
There is not a well-defined common ground on which elite women and ordinary 
women living in quite different circumstances in the same country can meet 
easily. But there is a perception of the need for such common ground - for a body 
of knowledge that would articulate women’s rights in ways that are not easily 
dismissable as “elitist,” “Western” or “feminist” that could help activists to be 
proactive and to avoid being put on the defensive. 
 
                                                 
17
 Kevin Dwyer (1991: 165) explains that while some Moroccan human rights organizations have broad-
based agendas, they have had difficulty challenging the public perception that their agendas are defined by 
political party affiliation. This misperception tends to undermine the efforts of these organizations, making 
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bell hooks (1984: 65) points out that we don’t all have to share the same 
oppression to forge a commitment to end oppression and that “diversity, disagreement, 
and difference” (1984: 64) within a movement are healthy, serving as a catalyst for new 
ideas and expanded membership. Moreover, the new social movement theory suggests 
that social movements may be more successful when they don’t require a high degree of 
consensus because that way they can be more easily adapted to local resources, networks, 
needs, and meanings (McClurg Miller 1992: 20). 
Given these caveats, the solutions that benefit women, even within a single 
country, may not be the same. For example, education is important for all women 
because literacy can contribute to an awareness of options and accessing of resources, but 
in Morocco it may hold additional rewards for urban women for whom there is a 
documented link between occupation, income, and educational achievement (Griffiths 
1996: 69). Nonetheless, education cannot serve as a panacea for a country that harbors 
many educated, yet unemployed youth. Hence, efforts could also be made to support 
economic initiatives that help guarantee women (and men) a living wage such as the 
unionizing of factories or the creation of agricultural cooperatives.
18
 These dialogues and 
initiatives will not take place without a lot of hard work. But as Badia Skalli, the Socialist 
Party female Parliament member, states, “Democracy doesn’t fall from the sky, madame. 
One has to learn it, practice, struggle for it” (quoted in Fernea 1998: 122-123). I believe 
that what the Moroccans should struggle for and a goal for which we should all strive is 
what Mernissi labels, “the ethics of uncertainty” (1995: 36). An “ethics of uncertainty” 
encourages debate, eschews totalizing answers, and is open-ended.  
Although Moroccan women have by no means stood still, Hesseini (1994: 69) 
describes these women as persons who continue to pass through public space rather than 
firmly occupy it. Clearly, the power of masculinity still permeates all aspects of 
Moroccan society, from conceptions of nationhood to the most “intimate” relationships. 
Too weighty an emphasis on change and resistance creates a danger of masking the 
entrenched nature of gender polarities and oppression because a greater significance may 
be attached to such change than it actually merits. Yet Macleod (1991: 126), an Arab-
American political scientist who conducted ethnographic research on the new veiling in 
Cairo, points out that subordinate groups are not nearly as fuzzy about their own interests 
nor as inactive as some theories concerning hegemony might imply.
19
 She (1991: 127) 
explains, “Struggle involves both subordinate and dominant groups in a linked 
interaction, an often lengthy and prolonged attempt to define and interpret current reality 
and the options for change.” There are, in fact, multiple and widening cracks in the 
hegemony of male dominance in Morocco, both longstanding and new, and that exist 
both formally, in the guise of organizations and informally, in the guise of periodic 
gatherings and everyday practices. To ignore or minimize these processes may be equally 
damaging in that doing so could prevent us from recognizing, supporting, and learning 
                                                 
18
 For example, the Egyptian government has initiated a small-scale project that grants land to women who 
are willing to farm it themselves after they have participated in training programs made available to them 
(Fernea 1998: 256).  
 
19
 Macleod (1996: 126-127) is addressing the works of Marx and Gramsci when she speaks of hegemony 
here. However, she does state that in some of Gramsci’s writing, he does grant subordinate groups greater 
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from voices that direct us to the future.
20
 If we are serious about building a movement 
that speaks for the many rather than the few, we need to find a way to allow the many to 
speak (or the multiple many), to avoid the facile labeling of “subordinates” as deluded by 
the fog of false consciousness,
21
 and to hear the voices at the margins and include them in 
the center (bell hooks 1984: 15). For to “hear” well is not simply a good idea, but should 





                                                 
20
 Macleod (1991: 156) points out, “Just as the acquiescent aspects of women’s behavior can be singled out 
for cooptation, so could the protesting elements be encouraged or developed.” Thus to ignore the 
“protesting” elements” could push women into more conservative camps and alienate them from the 
agendas of movements designed to improve women’s lives. 
 
21
 Macleod (1991:126) points out that “false consciousness” is normally a state attributed to subordinate 
groups by dominant groups. 
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